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C O G N I T I V E V E R S U S S O C I A L A S P E C T S O F P R A G M A T I C 
M E A N I N G : ON T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F I D E N T I F Y I N G 
T H E S U B J E C T A S A N E T H I C A L A G E N T 
Kanavi l l i l R A J A G O P A L A N 1 
• ABSTRACT: Is i t possible to reconcile the cognitive and the social aspects of 
pragmatic meaning? Or could i t be that the two are doomed forever to be 
locked i n a perennial tug-of-war? I argue in this paper that the radical ver­
sions of both these theses are faulty for the same reason: viz, that of seeking 
to capture i n a handful of deterministic rules everything that takes place at 
the pragmatic level. Furthermore, I argue that there is an urgent need to look 
upon the subject of language as a conscientious agent just as much as a per­
son endowed wi th consciousness. In other words, the ethical question is invaria­
bly present in the confrontation between the cognitive and the social. 
• KEYWORDS: Pragmatic meaning; cognitivism; social aspect; ethics. 
To ask whether the cognitive and the social aspects of pragmatic 
meaning can both be accommodated wi th in the framework of a single, 
overarching theory is to conduct the discussion against the backdrop 
of the common suspicion that there may be some fundamental and 
irreducible incompatibi l i ty between the two orientations. To be sure, 
this widespread suspicion has been, over the years, aided and abetted 
by a number of recent as wel l as not-so-recent developments. In the way 
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the battle lines have been drawn, say, over the last half a century or so, 
there is little room for any negotiated peace settlement or even an uneasy 
truce. And the reason why the twain seems never to meet is that the 
advocates of the two theoretical stances have often been at pains to 
state their respective positions in all or none terms. Neither side is 
wi l l ing to look into the possibility of there being a middle ground or, for 
that matter, a "no man's land". 
Radical cognitivists take their lead from a venerable tradition in 
thinking about language that posits the individual's psyche as the seat 
and bed-rock of language. Typical of the cognitivist stance is the follow­
ing assertion made by Whitney (1827-1894) more than a century ago: 
There can be asked respecting language no other question of a more ele­
mentary and at the same time of a more fundamentally important character 
than this: how is language obtained by us? how does each speaking individual 
become possessed of his speech? Its true answer involves and determines well-
nigh the whole of linguistic philosophy. (1875 11979] p.87) 
For the contemporary radical cognitivists like Pinker (Pinker, 1994), 
the social aspect of language is interesting, no doubt, but is by no 
means of the essence as far as human linguistic capacity is concerned. 
What is interesting, they say, invoking the authority of none other than 
Noam Chomsky - the man primarily responsible for the mentalist back­
lash in linguistics, is that it is all stored in the brain of the rndividual, a 
good deal of i t having been already inherited as part of Man's genetic 
endowment. Communication among persons similarly endowed is sim­
ply and straightforwardly a fall-out from this genetic disposition and 
any attempt to bring the issue of communication to centre stage in our 
attempt to understand language is tantamount to putt ing the cart 
before the horse. Chomsky (1977, p.87) is categorical when he says: 
There is no reason to believe ... that language "essentially" serves instru­
mental ends, or that the "essential purpose" of language is "communication", as 
is often said, at least if we mean by "communication" something like transmit­
ting information or inducing belief. 
Societal pragmatists, on their part, have a hard time overcoming 
their urge to meet the challenge of cognitivists on the latter's chosen 
turf. Some "radical societalists" are likely to react point blank by saying 
that the so-called individual is a mare's nest. The individual has no indi-
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viduality other than the one vouchsafed her by the social order of which 
she forms a part. The individual is, in other words, a derived category, 
and not a primitive concept as the cognitivists seem to assume. Heideg­
ger's famous dictum "Language speaks us," they hasten to add, is a 
case in point. In Borutti 's (1984, p.441) paraphrase, "subjects don't use 
the language, they are used by it : that is, they are the effects of their dis­
courses". And so is Althusser's idea of the subjects of languages as 
totally and irrecoverably subjected and subjugated pawns in an elabo­
rate chess-game over which they have no control whatsoever. 
Now, i t is important to stress that both cognitivists and societalists 
are potential victims of the very same danger of exaggerated scientism 
when they advocate radical versions of their respective positions. This 
point may not be immediately obvious, but is nonetheless fairly easy to 
shore up. Part of the appeal of cognitivism is its claim to rigorous stan­
dards of scientificity. Jacob Mey (1993, p.286), a relentless advocate of 
societalism i n pragmatics, has been quick to point that cognitivism's 
immense appeal and the mainstream status i t has traditionally enjoyed 
are largely due to the linguists' proverbial eagerness to define their field 
as a "pure" science in opposition to what are often pejoratively dismis­
sed as "social" and "applied" sciences. Mey is absolutely right i n sus­
pecting that the reason why many linguists shy away from the social 
character of pragmatic meanings is that they fear having to deal w i t h 
far too many variables that are, i n addition, somehow hopelessly "slip­
pery" and the consequent loss of predictive rigour. I n other words, looking 
at language as a biologically inherited phenomenon contained in the 
individual's psyche is a lot less "messy" than the alternative of looking at 
it as a social phenomenon, subject to all manner of extraneous influences. 
I also fully endorse Mey's implied suggestion that if the inalienably 
social nature of language cannot be adequately handled w i t h the expla­
natory resources of an algorithm, then so much the worse for the theory 
that attempts to do so. 
But care should be taken not to overstate the case in defence of 
societal pragmatics. For precious l i t t le is gained by simply reversing the 
priorities and insisting that the social order tells us all we need to know 
about the subject of language. Radical societalism is prompted by the 
very same urge to force the phenomenon of language into the grid of a 
neat algorithm, even if that algorithm turns out, on closer inspection, to 
be more of a Procrustean bed. The idea that language and society may 
be implicated in each other in ways that preclude the possibility of sta-
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t ing the relationship by means of unidirectional causal links is simply 
not considered by radical societalists in their eagerness to challenge the 
cognitivists' claim of the primacy of language and put forward their own 
claim of the primacy of the social order. This is because the model of 
"pure" science they have in mind - and which they share w i t h their cog-
nitivist adversaries - has no room for "reciprocal causality". The tena­
city w i th which the very possibility of reciprocal causality is shunned 
and frequently spurned by those who invoke the paradigm of pure sci­
ences is best illustrated by one of the earliest criticisms directed at Basil 
Bernstein's famous distinction between "restricted" and "elaborated" 
codes. Here is how i t goes: "According to Bernstein, the code (the l in ­
guistic rule system) is capable of producing 'n number of speech codes' 
which must satisfy its rules ... These speech codes are realised through 
the system of social relationships, of which they are a function" (Dittmar, 
1976, p.9). In other words, the central thrust of the criticism is that x is 
a function of y which in turn is taken to be a function of x - a situation 
that is implicit ly claimed to be one which no true scientist worth her salt 
can afford to admit. 
To escape the Scylla of a vicious circle, one can always opt for the 
Charybdis of turning the relation between the individual and the society 
upside down by arguing it is the latter that helps define the former. Radi­
cal societalism, which is but another name for this manoeuvre, w i l l cer­
tainly help avoid the sort of circularity that Dittmar lays at Bernstein's 
door, but perpetuates the very same drawbacks of thoroughbred indivi­
dualism. 
The danger is, to repeat a point already made, when one takes a 
pendulum swing to the other extreme by claiming that the concept of a 
social order is a pre-theoretical given and the individual is but a function 
thereof. By thus reducing the role of the subject of language to that of a 
mere cog in the wheel, one forecloses the very possibility of asking how 
it is that the individual can and often does stand up to the overwhel­
ming powers that seek to silence her voice. The case of Sophocles' 
Antigone springs to mind here. So too does that of Dr. Stockman, that 
unforgettable character from Ibsen's play. If Antigone and Dr. Stock­
man strike someone as being too fictive to be true to life, wel l , one 
might just as wel l consider the case of that frail-looking Chinese c i t i ­
zen empty-handedly defying an entire column of tanks in Beijing's Tia­
nanmen square. Far from being exceptions to a rule, these cases point 
to an ever-present, perhaps irreducible, tension between the private 
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(including, as in this last case, the right to free opinion) and the public 
in a person's life. 
N o w , I a m by no means a r g u i n g i n favour of c o n f l a t i n g t h e t w o 
opposi t ions "cogni t ive versus Social" and "pr ivate versus. Publ ic" . The 
former is u sua l ly s ta ted i n cu t - and -d ry te rms , whereas t h e latter, i t seems, 
is bes t cha rac te r i sed as a po la r oppos i t i on . B u t I do w a n t t o c l a i m t h a t 
any ser ious a n d i n - d e p t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e fo rmer o p p o s i t i o n w i l l i n e ­
v i t a b l y lead to a cons ide ra t ion of the la t ter oppos i t ion . Th i s is so because 
w h a t is a t s take is n o t j u s t t h e consciousness of t h e subjec t of l a n g u a g e 
bu t , i n a far more u r g e n t sense, her conscientiousness insofar as she is 
also a n e t h i c a l agent . The e t h i c a l a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l ques t ions are, i n 
o ther words , inseparab le f rom t h e c o g n i t i v e ro le of t h e agent , a l t h o u g h 
the Ra t iona l i s t t r a d i t i o n of t h o u g h t has s y s t e m a t i c a l l y s o u g h t to d r ive a 
w e d g e b e t w e e n t h e t w o sets of ques t ions . 
I t so happens, however, that, from Plato onwards, i t has been Wes­
tern philosophy's central concern to find newer and ever newer ways 
and means to make the private and the public mesh into each other to 
the point of becoming mutually indistinguishable, w i t h Reason as the 
ultimate arbiter and guarantor. The one abiding concern of political phi­
losophers since time immemorial has been to ascertain, on the one 
hand, the limits of the freedom of the individual and, on the other, stipu­
late how far the State should and should not go in invading the privacy 
of the individual. The recent sex scandals involving the President of the 
United States attest to the persistence of the concern in the political life 
of a nation which, as i t happens, is among those most concerned w i t h 
the individual's right to privacy. 
Now, one increasingly fashionable response to the challenge posed 
by the problem of drawing the line between the individual and the society 
- the former viewed as a sentient being, fully autonomous and answe­
rable only to herself and the latter thought of as a collectivity which is 
more than just the sum total of individual interests - is to dismiss the 
whole issue as a pseudo-problem, by summarily decreeing that there 
simply is no way of bringing the two together. Such a sweeping, radical 
solution has been recommended, for instance, by neo-pragmatists, most 
notably, Richard Rorty (passim, but especially, Rorty, 1989). Central to 
Rorty's stance is the claim that the private and the public are two dis­
tinct domains and that any attempt to subsume the two under some ove­
rarching category or to explain one in terms of the other is destined to 
be a fiasco, as the history of centuries of vain philosophising has - in his 
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view - amply demonstrated. Rorty therefore exhorts us to give up once 
and for all hope that public matters could be adjudicated by appeal to 
some non-contingent principles. Once we rid ourselves of all pretensi­
ons of classical metaphysics, Rorty thinks, we w i l l be in a position to 
espouse private irony as a way of coping wi th our lives. 
N o w , i t has been p o i n t e d ou t t h a t Ror ty ' s ins i s t ence o n m a i n t a i n i n g 
i n t a c t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p r i v a t e a n d t h e p u b l i c d o m a i n s is no t 
t o be seen as b e i n g of a p iece w i t h "the H e l l e n i s t i c or H a r e n d t i a n demar ­
c a t i o n of oikos a n d polis, b e t w e e n t h e domes t i c h e a r t h a n d t h e p u b l i c 
f o r u m " (Cr i tchley, 1996, p.21). T h e fact r emains , nonethe less , t h a t c o n ­
t e m p o r a r y p r a g m a t i s m is p r e d i c a t e d u p o n a c lea r -cu t d i s t i n c t i o n 
b e t w e e n t h e t w o , a l t h o u g h i t is r e a d i l y conceded t h a t ne i the r t h e i n d i ­
v i d u a l nor t h e State has any i d e n t i t y over a n d above w h a t i t c o n t i n g e n ­
t l y happens t o possess. T h e grea tes t m e r i t of p r a g m a t i s m is perhaps i t s 
p l a i n r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e fac t t h a t ours is a n age of c r u m b l i n g i d e n t i t i e s . 
E v e n ou t s ide of t h e p r a g m a t i s t c a m p , there seems to be a g r o w i n g per­
c e p t i o n t h a t t h e t i m e is r ipe for r e - t h i n k i n g t h e ve ry na tu re of some of 
t h e en t i t i es t h a t one used to t ake for g ran ted no t ve ry l o n g ago. The l i s t 
inc ludes "language", (Davidson, 1984; Burke & Porter, 1991) "the ( r igorou­
sly m o n o l i n g u a l ) speaker of a l anguage" (Rajagopalan, 1997; for thco­
m i n g ) , "na t ion" , (Bhabha, 1994) a n d "cul ture" . A n d , to be sure, theor i s t s of 
l anguage c a n i l l afford to ignore w h a t is t a k i n g p lace under the i r ve ry 
noses, o n p a i n of r e n d e r i n g the i r ref lec t ions mere exercises i n w i l d fancy. 
But, because of its reluctance to admit of the possibility that the 
distinction between the private and the public may turn out to be ten­
sion-ridden rather than being one characterised by mutual exclusion, 
pragmatism is hard put to i t to explain the all-too-frequent clashes of 
interest between the two domains. Rorty, i t seems, tends to somewhat 
complacently sidestep the whole issue by conjuring up a Utopian state 
modelled after "the rich North Atlantic democracies" where he thinks 
the citizens have learnt to separate public liberalism and private irony. 
Indeed Rorty is all for private irony, which he says is what we are left 
wi th , once we have extricated ourselves from the clutches of academic 
Philosophy wi th its tireless quest for first principles on which to ground 
public morality. As he puts i t i n his essay "On the priority of democracy 
to philosophy", instead of looking for such transcendental, ahistorical, 
Archimedian points of reference outside of one's lived circumstances, 
one ought to be "putting politics first and tailoring a philosophy to suit" 
(Rorty, 1991, p.178). 
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The only trouble w i t h the rosy picture presented by contemporary 
pragmatism is that i t assumes a vast consensus already arrived at by 
members of a community that has supposedly overcome all sources of 
potential tension by democratically thrashing out differences of interest. 
Instead of countenancing a world divided between US and THEM, Ror-
tyan pragmatists recommend that we concentrate on US, hoping that 
the category so designated w i l l constantly expand as to some day in the 
remotest future (maybe only in a Utopian world) absorb everyone that 
gets classified today as part of THEM. 
The paradisiac vision of democracy entailed by the pragmatist view 
is but a rehashing of the old Biblical idea of the lion and the lamb 
enjoying, as i t were, a "heavenly picnic" in the best spirit of celestial 
camaraderie. But one must admit that i t is a far cry from anything one 
actually comes across, even in the "rich North Atlantic democracies" of 
which Rorty speaks w i t h such great enthusiasm and approval. Arguably 
too, the very view of democracy as a form of rule where tensions are gra­
dually replaced by harmony and uniformity of interests is not at all help­
ful except as a wilful exercise of romantic imagination. In real societies, 
private and public interests do frequently clash and, as noted earlier, 
Sophocles' Antigone and Ibsen's Dr. Stockman (alongside of countless 
cases from real life) are constant reminders to the often irreconcilable 
clash of interests between the two domains. 
The picture is further complicated by the fact that the pragmatists' 
idea of democracy is modelled on their idea of language in thinking 
about which they claim the notion of transparent representation is of l i t ­
tle help. If, as they say, language ought not to be seen as acting as a ter-
tium quid between the external world and the sentient mind, so too the 
pragmatists are claiming that a healthy democracy is no longer to be 
seen as encumbered by the age-old preoccupation w i t h being a means 
for the individual to partake of the collective decision-making. In both 
cases, the very idea of representation is to be traded without remorse for 
some such notion as "self-fashioning" or an ever-expanding sense of 
"recognition" (Taylor, 1992). 
Ingenious though such moves may well be, what we sti l l fail to 
account for is the fact that i n the world of lived reality, the relations 
among persons and between these and the society at large is ridden 
w i t h strife and conflict. I t is pointless and perverse to simply wish them 
away or pretend they did not exist. While the Rortyan pragmatists are 
right as far as their criticism of transparent representation is concerned, 
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to propose that we should therefore give up the very idea of representa­
tion is to throw the baby of representation along w i t h the bath-water of 
transparency. The usefulness of language as representation consists 
precisely in foregrounding the political (and hence, in the ultimate ana­
lysis, the ethical) question - for, representation is, over and above every­
thing else, a political question. Even as perfect representation by lan­
guage of a putatively pre-existent reality turns out, i n the final analysis, 
to be a contradiction in terms, so too its political analogue is at best an 
ideal state of affairs to be cherished rather than something one should 
effectively hope to see realised on the face of this earth. But i t is preci­
sely because the ensuing tensions cannot be done away w i t h once and 
for all that there arises the need for a practical ethic. In other words, 
there w i l l for ever be a role for the ethical subject of language for the 
simple reason that perfect and stable equilibrium of forces is an unattai­
nable goal insofar as human linguistic practices are concerned. This 
means that the agent is required to be on the alert all the time, to endles­
sly re-negotiate the limits of the elbow room wi th in which she may 
fashion her own self. Furthermore, she is constantly going to be called 
upon to weigh alternative courses of action, make choices, and take 
decisions, including some that she may come to regret later on. But then, 
come to think of it, there is nothing unfamiliar about such demands on 
her. The ethical agent has always been and w i l l always be a t ight rope 
walker. 
W h a t the cogni t ive and the societal domains of contemporary research 
i n p r a g m a t i c s u r g e n t l y c a l l for, t h e n , is a n a t t e m p t a t c r i t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n 
ra ther t h a n e i ther t h e search for a w i d e r f r a m e w o r k t h a t c a n comfor t ab ly 
accommoda te the t w o or the a t t e m p t t o m a k e e i ther d o m a i n dependen t 
on the other. A c r i t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n w i l l , as I have been sugges t ing , sh i f t 
t h e focus of a t t e n t i o n f rom t h e c o g n i t i v e - s o c i e t a l o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e oppo­
s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p r i v a t e a n d t h e p u b l i c doma ins , w i t h a v i e w to in te r ­
r o g a t i n g t h e role of t h e subjec t of l a n g u a g e as a n e t h i c a l agent . 
Note 
This paper is a slightly revised version of a text used for oral pre­
sentation at the 6 t h International Pragmatics Conference (Reims, France 
19-24 July 1998). I wish to thank the CNPq for financing my research 
(Process n. 306151/88-0) and for sponsoring my participation in the said 
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event. (Process n. 450951/98-7). I also wish to express my gratitude to 
Jacob Mey for his comments on the paper (in his capacity as the discus-
sant of the session). 
RAJAGOPALAN, K. Aspectos cognitivos versus aspectos sociais da significação 
pragmática: a importancia da identificação do sujeito como agente ético. Alfa 
(São Paulo), v.43, p.135-144, 1999. 
• RESUMO: Épossível reconciliar o lado cognitivo e o lado social da significação 
pragmática? Ou, será que os dois estão condenados a permanecerem num estado 
permanente de conflito mútuo? Procuro sustentar neste trabalho que as versões 
radicais de ambas as teses, opostas entre si, pecam pelo seguinte motivo: querer 
captar tudo o que acontece no plano da pragmática num punhado de regras 
determinísticas. Argumento, em seguida, que é preciso encarar o sujeito de lin-
guagem tanto como um agente consciencioso quanto uma pessoa consciente. 
Em outras palavras, a questão ética necessariamente se faz presente neste 
embate entre o social e o cognitivo. 
• PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Significação pragmática; cognitivismo; aspecto social; 
questão ética. 
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